Wada report on Russia: Specific Findings 

November 10th, 2015 Christoph Posted in Doping, Korruption, Sportpolitik No Comments »

Download the Indenpendent Commission report of Wada on Russia

With respect to the Moscow laboratory 

  1. [Chapter 9] Grigory Rodchenko, director of the Moscow accredited laboratory was specifically identified as an aider and abettor of the doping activities.
  2. [Chapter 13] The IC investigation found violations of ISL article 4.1.8 in respect of the Moscow laboratory. 3. [Chapter 13] The reported presence of the security services (FSB) within the laboratory setting in Sochi and at the Moscow laboratory, actively imposed an atmosphere of intimidation on laboratory process and staff, and supported allegations of state influence in sports events.    4. [Chapter 13] The direct interference into the laboratory’s operations by the Russian State significantly undermines the laboratory’s independence.
  3. [Chapter 13] Many tests that the laboratory has conducted should be considered highly suspect.
  4. [Chapter 13] Assessed as a whole, the IC finds that these investigative reports demonstrate strong corroborating evidence that the Moscow laboratory has been involved in a widespread cover-up of positive doping tests. 7. [Chapter 13] The IC further finds that at the heart of the positive drug test coverup is Dir. Rodchenkov. He not only accepted, but also requested money in order to execute the concealment positive test results, which makes him equally responsible for incidents where coaches or officials extorted athletes even if he was not personally made aware of the extortion.
  5. [Chapter 13] The IC finds that Dir. Rodchenkov’s statements regarding the destruction of the samples are not credible. They purport to explain the destruction of a large number of potentially important samples on the basis of an alleged inconsistent understanding of the clear instructions received and acknowledged by Rodchenkov.
  6. [Chapter 13] WADA officials and IC members conducted two subsequent interviews of Dir. Rodchenkov on 26 March 2015 and 30 June 2015, where on both occasions, he admitted to intentionally destroying the 1,417 samples in order to limit the extent of WADA’s audit and to reduce any potential adverse findings from subsequent analysis by another WADA accredited laboratory.
  7. [Chapter 13] The intentional destruction of the 1,417 samples done with the purpose of obstructing WADA’s ability to conduct follow up analysis on the samples was corroborated by another staff member who heard similar admissions directly from Dir. Rodchenkov.
  8. [Chapter 13] [Regarding unmarked samples of unknown origins] The IC finds that the testing of samples is a highly improper practice and a violation of the ISL standards and the Code.
  9. [Chapter 13] The only reasonable conclusion is that the unmarked samples were provided (the documentation in respect of which was ordered to be destroyed) for purposes of monitoring drug use, clearance times and maintenance of certain levels below thresholds that might produce Adverse Analytical Findings (AAF) in proper testing circumstances.
  10. [Chapter 13] The Moscow laboratory is not operationally independent from RUSADA or the Ministry of Sport. Its impartiality, judgment and integrity were compromised by the surveillance of the FSB within the laboratory during the Sochi Winter Olympic Games.
  11. [Chapter 13] The apprehension of surveillance by the staff in the Moscow laboratory caused by FSB representatives regularly visiting the laboratory and weekly discussions occurring between the Moscow laboratory Director and the Russian Security service affect the impartiality, judgment and integrity of the laboratory.
  12. [Chapter 13] The IC concludes that there was direct intimidation and interference by the Russian state with the Moscow laboratory operations.
  13. [Chapter 13] The Moscow laboratory Director was paid indirectly by one of the whistleblowers to conceal a doping test taken while the athlete was knowingly competing dirty. The go-between who received the money is a known performance-enhancing substances trafficker.
  14. [Chapter 13] There is strong corroborating evidence that the Moscow laboratory has been involved in a widespread cover-up of positive doping tests.
  15. [Chapter 13] Director Rodchenkov was also an integral part of the conspiracy to extort money from athletes in order to cover up positive doping test results.
  16. [Chapter 14] The IC discovered the existence of a second laboratory in Moscow, apparently having the same testing capabilities as the WADA accredited laboratory. Its precise use is unknown. The laboratory is known as the “Laboratory of the Moscow Committee of Sport for Identification for Prohibited Substances in Athlete Samples” and is controlled by the city of Moscow government.  The laboratory Director is Dr. Giorgi Bezhanishvili, a forensic toxicologist.
  17. [Chapter 14] There is sufficient corroborated evidence to conclude that the second laboratory was assisting in the cover-up of positive doping results by way of the destruction of samples.
  18. [Chapter 14] Pre-screened samples that were not positive could then be sent to the accredited laboratory.
  19. [Chapter 14] Such evidence was given on a confidential basis due to fear of reprisals against the witnesses providing the evidence.
  20. [Chapter 19] Moscow laboratory director Rodchenkov had direct access to the Minister for purposes of funding requests for laboratory equipment.

With respect to RUSADA 

  1. [Chapter 9] RUSADA had a practice of providing advance notice of out-ofcompetition tests.
  2. [Chapter 9] The IC determined that there were many examples of inadequate, incorrect or inexistent whereabouts filings on the part of Russian athletes participating in athletics.
  3. [Chapter 9] The IC determined that there were many occasions on which Russian athletes participating in athletics were given advance notice of proposed out-ofcompetition tests and were thus able to avoid being tested or take steps to render the tests ineffective.
  4. [Chapter 9] The IC determined that there were many examples of missed tests on the part of Russian athletes participating in athletics.
  5. [Chapter 9] The IC found examples of the use of false identities for purposes of evading testing.
  6. [Chapter 12] RUSADA DCOs routinely accept bribes from the athletes, thereby ensuring that the doping control test will not be effective.
  7. [Chapter 9] There was intimidation of the DCO, both direct and in relation to the DCO’s family members.
  8. [Chapter 12] RUSADA DCOs routinely do not follow the International Standard for Testing despite being trained as to how to conduct tests.
  9. [Chapter 12] RUSADA DCOs do not always complete a mission when first given to them, but await the filing of new whereabouts information reflecting a location closer to Moscow where they are based.
  10. [Chapter 12] RUSADA allowed athletes under current anti-doping sanctions to compete during the period of the sanctions, contrary to a specific Code prohibition.
  11. [Chapter 12] RUSADA DCOs routinely do not follow the International Standard for Testing despite being trained as to how to conduct tests.
  12. [Chapter 12] A review of a sampling of RUSADA’s reporting procedures showed significant gaps in reporting and unexplained deficiencies in submissions to ADAMS. DCFs were either not entered into ADAMS or were significantly delayed. An increased effort in DCF submissions will assist in generating a timely and transparent results management process, subject to the integrity of the overall operations of testing and that process.
  13. [Chapter 12] The IC review revealed that RUSADA has a favourable record of collecting samples and conducting analysis for particular substances that are of high risk for athletes in comparison to other NADOs, for example EPO and IRMS analysis.
  14. [Chapter 12] RUSADA hGH testing has been insufficient and questions remain regarding the methods applied by the Moscow laboratory for ESAs on behalf of RUSADA.
  15. [Chapter 12] The inaccuracy and non-compliance of the “whereabouts” information for Russian athletes is obstructing out-of-competition testing and timely notification of athletes for other potential violations. An increased effort in this area will complement effective target testing for RUSADA.
  16. [Chapter 12] Allegations of collusion between coaches and RUSADA have established major concerns about RUSADA’s functioning as an impartial institution.
  17. [Chapter 12] As incidents of inaction regarding reporting and DCF filings are attributed to RUSADA, a review of the applicable processes, specifically implementation and enforcement, is required in order to provide the international community with confidence that the issues discovered are being suitably addressed.
  18. [Chapter 12] Athletes under current anti-doping sanctions were allowed to compete during the period of the sanctions, contrary to a specific Code prohibition. It is highly unlikely that this could have occurred without the knowledge and consent of both RUSADA and ARAF.
  19. [Chapter 12] TDPs, no matter how well designed, can be compromised by advance notice of out-of-competition testing, false or inaccurate whereabouts information, interference by coaches and officials, evidence of all of which was discovered by the IC investigation.
  20. [Chapter 13] RUSADA is routinely requesting limited benchwork examination in completing testing of samples.
  21. [Chapter 14] It is not credible to believe that the existence and capabilities of the second laboratory were unknown to ARAF and RUSADA.
  22. [Chapter 17] In the later stages of the IC investigation, IDTM DCOs proved themselves to be more reliable and effective in their role than their RUSADA counterparts.
  23. [Chapter 18] RUSADA acted in a manner that enabled athletes to continue competing by declaring samples to be negative for AAFs and not cancelling certain competition results – leading to further appeals to CAS.
  24. [Chapter 18] The ARD documentary allegations that there was a scheme to provide Russian athletics athletes having abnormal ABPs with delayed testing notification cannot be confirmed at this time on the evidence the IC possesses.

With respect to ARAF 

  1. [Chapter 9] The athlete Anastasiya Bazdyreva aggressively refused to cooperate with the IC investigators.
  2. [Chapter 9] [Regarding Anastasiya Bazdyreva] The athlete’s coach, her doctor (Igor Gubchenko) and the interim ARAF president (Mr. Zelichenok) refused to cooperate with the IC investigators.
  3. [Chapter 9] The athlete interview of Ekatrina Poistogova was interrupted after the athlete spoke with her doctor (Igor Gubchenko).
  4. [Chapter 9] The interim ARAF president (Mr. Zelichenok) demanded that the IC investigators not speak with the athletes.
  5. [Chapter 9] [Regarding the DCO mission to the Yunost training camp] The responsible team official denied that most of the athletes were present, thereby obstructing the doping control process.
  6. [Chapter 9] [Regarding the DCO mission to the Yunost training camp] The responsible team official asserted that the DCO had no right to test the athletes (in a private hotel), such ill-founded contention further obstructing the doping control process.
  7. [Chapter 9] Medications and syringes were present in the athletes’ room.
  8. [Chapter 9] Coaches and athletes had received instructions following the ARD documentary not to speak with the IC and not to sign any documents.
  9. [Chapter 9] Coaches claimed that the DCO had no right to test athletes who were not in the Registered Testing Pool (notwithstanding IAAF rules).
  10. [Chapter 9] Coaches were complicit in attempting to prevent access to athletes for testing, thereby obstructing the doping control process.
  11. [Chapter 9] There are clear cases of refusals to be tested involved, which should be investigated and acted upon, including Dyldin.
  12. [Chapter 9] Athletes were instructed to record information that was not true in their DCFs, such as times of notification.
  13. [Chapter 9] The fact that 9 AAFs for EPO resulted from the tests on that Saransk training camp mission underscores the reasons for the resistance to the tests.
  14. [Chapter 9] The dates of the reported events at the Saransk training camp make it clear that, contrary to some assertions, the practice of doping in athletics in Russia remains very much current, even following the ARD documentary.
  15. [Chapter 9] Athletes deliberately gave their coach’s number as their whereabouts contact, to avoid direct contact by DCOs and to provide additional time before giving a sample.
  16. [Chapter 9] No athletes answered the DCO calls. The IC considers it likely that this conduct was based upon instructions from the coaching or support staff.
  17. [Chapter 9] Deliberate efforts were made to stretch the time between notice and the provision of samples for analysis, to provide opportunity for obstructive actions in relation to the tests.
  18. [Chapter 9] The doctor/observer refused to provide his name when requested to do so by the DCO.
  19. [Chapter 9] Coaches have a financial interest in protecting their athletes from doping tests that might produce positive findings.
  20. [Chapter 9] Coaches attempted to intimidate and threaten the DCO in the course of his duties as DCO.
  21. [Chapter 9] Coach Nikitin lied about the presence of targeted athletes at the Saransk training camp, in an effort to prevent the athletes from being tested.
  22. [Chapter 9] Having considered the two circumstances involving Ms. Pecherina, the IC prefers the statements made in the first ARD documentary, when she was not being influenced by one or more off-screen parties.
  23. [Chapter 9] There is insufficient evidence to support the figure of 99% of members of the Russian national athletics team as dopers. That said, Ms. Pecherina was a member of the national team and can be taken to be aware of significant doping going on around her.
  24. [Chapter 9] Evidence of extensive PED use is supported and confirmed by audio and video evidence. It is also documented by witness statements that corroborate the original allegations of the German television documentary and which provide further details regarding the extensive use of PEDs and blood doping within the Russian federation.
  25. [Chapter 9] Within the scope of this investigation, there is clear evidence of a “Systemic Culture of Doping in Russian Sport” perpetuated, in part, although not exclusively, through coaches and administrators, whose collective actions at times extended beyond mere administrative violations into potentially criminal acts.
  26. [Chapter 9] This network created an atmosphere in which an athlete’s choice was frequently limited to accepting the prescribed and mandated doping regimen or not being a member of the national team.
  27. [Chapter 9] The coaches wrongfully encouraged their athletes, or athletes chose to believe that all other nations were following similar illicit training methods, thereby creating a self-justification that ‘sport doping’ and the non-enforcement of violations were competitive necessities and perhaps even patriotic obligations.
  28. [Chapter 11] There has been cover-up and delay by ARAF in the investigating of athletes with abnormal passport profiles who should have been banned, and prevented from participating in the London Olympics. Several of these athletes were allowed to compete and some went on to win medals.
  29. [Chapter 11] The IC investigation found overwhelming evidence against a number of senior national team coaches who were involved in collusion to illicitly obtain details of suspicious ABP testing results against their athletes. Such conduct demonstrates an embedded and institutionalized process designed to secure winning at any cost.
  30. [Chapter 11] The IC found evidence that several coaches at senior level and the ARAF Chief Medical Officer were committing violations of the Code articles 2.6, 2.8 and 2.9 over many years.
  31. [Chapter 11] Former President Balakhnichev is ultimately responsible, both individually and as an ARAF representative, for the wrongful actions that occurred while he was President.
  32. [Chapter 11] The examination of the conduct and standards of ARAF senior coaches has revealed that a number of them were found to be in violation of WADA Code 2.8 and 2.9 and subsequently recommended for appropriate sanctions.
  33. [Chapter 11] For at least two coaches, digital recordings and forensic analysis confirm their involvement in the trafficking of prohibited substances.
  34. [Chapter 11] On the secret whistleblower recordings, coaches discussed with athletes, in their own words, how ABP testing can be circumvented, the problems ARAF has had with preventing ABP from capturing violations of their athletes and what they can do about it in the future, including the suggestion of administering newly developed PEDs that will escape detection.
  35. [Chapter 11] As a result of the IC investigation, ARAF Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Portugalov, has been reported for committing offenses under articles 2.8 and 2.9 of the Code, which not only undermines his position as a medical professional, but also demonstrates a complete disregard for the health and well-being of the athletes.
  36. [Chapter 11] As of June 2015, there continues to exist widespread doping taking place at the OTC in Saransk, despite the ongoing and well-publicized investigation into doping on the Russian athletics team. Russian coaches apparently felt it was safe enough for six out of ten race walkers, who tested positive, to continue doping as part of their training program, supporting cheating within athletics.
  37. [Chapter 11] There was active use of blood transfusion equipment at the OTC, which is supported by forensic analysis demonstrating systematic use of this type of equipment to gain sporting advantage.
  38. [Chapter 11] The former Director of the OTC was sanctioned for the possession of the blood transfusion equipment at the Center.
  39. [Chapter 11] OTC Head Coach, Viktor Chegin, who is the subject of separate IAAF and RUSADA investigations, is responsible for the events that have occurred at the OTC and will be formally reported by the IC for offenses and recommended for sanctions.
  40. [Chapter 11] The intentional delay and obstruction of the DCO’s mission that was created by the coaches at the OTC during the unannounced ITDM doping mission in June 2015 possibly assisted some of the remaining four athletes to escape a positive sample detection.
  41. [Chapter 12] Athletes under current anti-doping sanctions were allowed to compete during the period of the sanctions, contrary to a specific Code prohibition. It is highly unlikely that this could have occurred without the knowledge and consent of both RUSADA and ARAF.
  42. [Chapter 13] There was collusion between the President of ARAF and the laboratory Director Rodchenkov to conceal positive drug tests by swapping clean samples for known dirty “A” samples at the Moscow lab. Athletes paid both the President and the Director for the benefit of such services.
  43. [Chapter 13] At least one elite world marathoner paid her coach, Melinkov and the medical director of ARAF, Portugalov, annual sums of money, a portion of those monies being to protect her from receiving a positive drug result from her doping activities.
  44. [Chapter 13] Interviews with athletes and secret recordings led to the finding that within Athletics, (which is the only sport that the IC was mandated to investigate) there were a series of high-level individuals involved, who, for monetary payments, conspired to conceal positive doping samples, leading to the conclusion that there was likely a system in Russia for cover-ups in doping.
  45. [Chapter 14] It is not credible to believe that the existence and capabilities of the second laboratory were unknown to ARAF and RUSADA.
  46. [Chapter 15] The Deputy Director General of the Russian Federal Research Center of Physical Culture and Sports (VNIIFK), Dr. Sergey Portugalov, who is also the Chief of the ARAF’s medical commission, provided banned substances to Russian athletes and was very active in the conspiracy to cover-up athletes’ positive tests in exchange for a percentage of their winnings.
  47. [Chapter 15] The IC finds that not only did Dr. Portugalov supply PEDs to athletes and coaches, but also administered the doping programs and even injected athletes himself.
  48. [Chapter 15] The IC finds that it was demonstrated that Dr. Portugalov’s actions over many years are in violation of Code Item 2.8 “Administration or Attempted Administration to any Athlete Out-of-Competition of any Prohibited Substance or any Prohibited Method that is prohibited Out-of-Competition” and Code Item 2.9 “Complicity – Assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, conspiring, covering up or any other type of intentional complicity involving an anti-doping rule violation, attempted anti-doping rule violation or violation of Article 10.12.1 by another person.”
  49. [Chapter 15] Dr. Portugalov was the subject of a sanctions package containing evidence the IC had gathered which it turned over to WADA, recommending a lifetime ban from sport. The IC is informed that its sanctions package has been submitted to IAAF with the acceptance by WADA of the proposed IC recommendation. The sanctions package and report was forwarded to ARAF on 08 August 2015 for further consideration.
  50. [Chapter 18] There was no interaction between ARAF and RUSADA once IAAF notifications were given, leading to CAS proceedings later withdrawn.
  51. [Chapter 19] There was evident institutional knowledge that coaches expected Russian sports officials to protect their athletes from the consequences of doping.

With respect to the Russian Federation (Ministry of Sport) 

  1. [Chapter 9] Russian law enforcement agencies were involved in the efforts to interfere with the integrity of the samples.
  2. [Chapter 12] Regardless of Ms. Zhelanova’s statement that RUSADA acts independently, although financed by the Ministry, the IC has serious doubts that it is truly independent. Various sources reported to the IC that there is more influence than structurally indicated by the Ministry of Sport.
  3. [Chapter 19] There are inconsistent versions of what has happened within Russia regarding investigation and actions subsequent to the ARD documentary.
  4. [Chapter 19] Ms. Zhelanova stated that an investigation had occurred and that a report was expected by the end of the year (2015).
  5. [Chapter 19] Another version was that all of the athletes implicated had been interviewed, that they had all denied any complicity and that the matter was, therefore, dropped.
  6. [Chapter 19] The Minister said that investigations had occurred and that certain people had been fired.
  7. [Chapter 19] It is inexplicable that Minsport would allow RUSADA, as the subject of several of the allegations in the ARD documentary, to investigate itself.
  8. [Chapter 19] Minsport did nothing to investigate the serious allegations of criminal conduct on the part of Russian sport officials.
  9. [Chapter 19] Many individuals were unwilling to speak candidly regarding relationships between Minsport, RUSADA and the Moscow laboratory out of fear for reprisals.
  10. [Chapter 19] The IC was unable to corroborate allegations of direct influence by Minsport on the activities of RUSADA and the Moscow laboratory.

With respect to the IAAF 

  1. [Chapter 9] There was potential interference with the integrity of the samples, thwarted only by the extraordinary evasive actions taken by the DCO.
  2. [Chapter 9] The IC found examples of outright refusals by athletes, despite notification and evidence that the tester was an official DCO.
  3. [Chapter 10] The IC investigation ultimately corroborated the whistleblower’s allegations of a multifaceted and complex conspiracy involving members of the athletic community within the IAAF and ARAF.
  4. [Chapter 10] The IC investigation found evidence of breaches of processes and rules of the Code and ISL Standards, as well as IAAF rules and processes by IAAF officials.
  5. [Chapter 18] For the reasons mentioned above, and given that the IAAF only sent the ARAF official notification of Sergey Kirdyapkin’s abnormal ABP on October 1, 2012, which is nearly one year after the IAAF initially informed ARAF of his abnormal ABP (Kirdyapkin was an athlete included on the list of November 18, 2011), the IC considers that there was an excessive time delay.
  6. [Chapter 18] [Regarding Vladimir Kanaykin] The IC finds that the IAAF ought to have expedited the results management report to ARAF because of the pending London 2012 Games.
  7. [Chapter 18] [Regarding Vladimir Kanaykin] The IC finds that following initial contact there was an excessive delay of 18 months before the IAAF followed up with ARAF.
  8. [Chapter 18] [Regarding Valeriy Borchin]The IC finds that following initial contact there was an excessive delay of 21 months before the IAAF followed up with ARAF regarding the potential ADRV.
  9. [Chapter 18] [Regarding Olga Kaniskina] The IC finds that the IAAF ought to have expedited the results management report to ARAF because of the pending London 2012 Games in which the athlete competed.
  10. [Chapter 18] [Regarding Sergey Bakulin] The IC finds that the IAAF ought to have expedited the matter to an ABP expert panel prior to the pending 2012 London Games.
  11. [Chapter 18] [Regarding Asli Cakir Alptekin] The IC finds that the IAAF ought to have expedited the matter to an ABP expert panel prior to the pending 2012 London Games.
  12. [Chapter 18] There was considerable delay by the IAAF Anti-Doping department, varying between 18 months and 25 months, in informing the athlete and the ARAF of the investigation into an athlete’s potential ADRV based on the ABP. This resulted in athletes being able to compete in the London 2012 Olympics and other world athletics events. Furthermore, the notification letters were not always consistent in offering a two-year sanction in exchange for a prompt admission.
  13. [Chapter 18] If an athlete chose a provisional suspension, if it was offered, then the IAAF took anywhere from 18 months (Bakulin) to 25 months (Kirdyapkin) to follow up to determine if ARAF had investigated or initiated disciplinary proceedings.
  14. [Chapter 18] After initial notification by the IAAF of a possible ADRV the ARAF took up to more than 2 years to take action the notifications it received.
  15. [Chapter 18] IAAF was inexplicably lax in following up suspicious blood (and other) profiles.
  16. [Chapter 18] ARAF was inexplicably lax in following up notifications from IAAF, equally the IAAF failed to act expeditiously in following up on results management.
  17. [Chapter 18] The delays by both the IAAF and ARAF led to athletes competing in the London 2012 Olympics who should have been prevented from competing (and who were/are later sanctioned).
  18. [Chapter 18] There are inconsistencies in the proposed sanctions by IAAF and the eventual sanctions.
  19. [Chapter 18] There are unexplained delays in getting the CAS appeals argued and decided.

With respect to WADA 

  1. [Chapter 20] WADA faces pressures from stakeholders to undertake more and more responsibilities in the fight against doping in sport, but without concomitant increases in the resources necessary to accomplish the necessary activities.
  2. [Chapter 20] WADA’s coordination of the fight against doping in sport could be made easier if the use of ADAMS was compulsory and that all providers of data required pursuant to the Code not capable of direct entries into ADAMS assume any additional costs of the incorporation of the necessary data.
  3. [Chapter 20] Now implementing the third version of the Code, WADA needs to continue its educational role, but also to insist on compliance by all Signatories.
  4. [Chapter 20] Actual and potential conflicts of interest at the WADA Executive Committee and Foundation Board make decisive actions regarding Code compliance unnecessarily difficult to achieve.
  5. [Chapter 20] WADA continues to face a recalcitrant attitude on the part of many stakeholders that it is merely a service provider and not a regulator.
  6. [Chapter 20] While consensus and compliance, where possible, are preferable, WADA has been unduly tentative with signatories in requiring compliance and timely action.
  7. [Chapter 20] WADA staff have the necessary scientific and technical qualifications and have the required abilities to administer the world anti-doping program and to deal with scientific and compliance issues. They need to hire staff who will be able to run international investigations throughout multiple jurisdictions in order to assist in the investigation aspects of doping and ensure compliance with the ISTI.
  8. [Chapter 20] WADA has been effective in changing the focus of anti-doping programs to that of protecting the clean athletes.
  9. [Chapter 20] Delays in the implementation of actions required in cases of suspected doping can compromise the effectiveness of anti-doping programs.
  10. [Chapter 20] WADA is not aware of all contractual relationships at accredited laboratories that may have an impact on the operational capabilities of the laboratories.
  11. [Chapter 20] WADA is not necessarily aware of all circumstances in which doping control officers have been interfered with or when obstruction of their duties may have occurred.
  12. [Chapter 20] WADA needs to develop a whistle blower assistance and protection program to facilitate the encouraging of whistle blowers activities.

With respect to the Lausanne Laboratory 

  1. [Chapter 16] The IC has not discovered evidence that would support otherwise culpable conduct on the part of the Lausanne laboratory in relation to the destruction of the samples.
  2. [Chapter 16] The Lausanne laboratory acted contrary to specific instructions received from WADA to retain the 67 samples transferred to it from the Moscow laboratory.
  3. [Chapter 16] The IC is not satisfied with the explanations given for the destruction of the samples transferred from the Moscow laboratory.
  4. [Chapter 16] The prohibited substance discovered in one of the transferred samples was at a level lower than that which the Moscow laboratory was able to discover.
  5. [Chapter 16] As a result of the destruction of the samples transferred from the Moscow laboratory, there is insufficient corroborating evidence to support the allegations by Mr. Popov of a conspiracy involving coach Melnikov and director Rodchenkov to ensure that certain athletes were to have samples substituted in the event of positive tests, for which a fee would be paid to Rodchenkov.

Other Findings

  1. [Chapter 9] The hotel management confirmed the presence of the athletes targeted for testing.
  2. [Chapter 17] IDTM took internal independent measures to conduct an investigation following the release of the ARD documentary, which resulted in the dismissal of staff implicated in the documentary.
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Transparenz vs FIFA-Korruption 3:0

Dezember 28th, 2011 sportticker Posted in Fußball, Korruption, Sportpolitik No Comments »

Screenshot: www.handelszeitung.ch

Weihnachten ist vorbei. Aber all jenen, denen von Joseph Blatters unendlichen und unwahren FIFA-Reformversprechen bereits die Ohren bluten, hat das Obergericht in Zug nun nachträglich noch ein besonders hübsches Präsent überreicht. Das Gericht entschied auf Antrag von Jean-Francois Tanda (Homepage/Twitter) von der Schweizer „Handelszeitung“, dass die brisante Einstellungsverfügung zum ISL-Verfahren veröffentlicht werden muss. Das Gericht begründete seinen Entscheid mit einem gewichtigen Interesse der Öffentlichkeit an den Umständen der Verfahrenseinstellung, die viele Fragen aufwerfe.

Das Papier aus dem Mai 2010 dokumentiert eine Vereinbarung hochrangiger FIFA-Funktionäre und der aktuellen FIFA-Spitze mit Schweizer Ermittlern und sollte geheim bleiben. Es ist ein Ablasshandel, der Korruption vertuscht und nicht aufklärt oder für Wiedergutmachung sorgt. Die genannten Parteien tauschten ein Schweigegeld in Millionenhöhe gegen die Einstellung des Verfahrens gegen sie und, noch viel bedeutender, gegen die Zusicherung, dass ihre Namen nicht öffentlich gemacht würden. Andernfalls wären Ricardo Teixeira und Blatters Mentor und Vorgänger Joao Havelange schon längst offiziell als Empfänger von Schmiergeldern des 2001 kollabierten Sportrechtevermarkters ISL/ISMM enttarnt worden und nicht nur in Recherchen von Andrew Jennings für die BBC. Und es wäre bekannt geworden, dass die FIFA-Spitze, also Präsident Joseph Blatter, „immer von den Schmiergeldzahlungen an ihre Exponenten gewusst hat, aber nichts dagegen unternommen hatte“, wie es Tanda nun in der „Handelszeitung“ formuliert.

Die Geschichte des einst größten Sportrechtemaklers der Welt ISL/ISMM und des größten bekannten Schmiergeldskandals der Sportgeschichte hat Jens Weinreich in seinem Blog mehrfach ausführlich aufgeschrieben (etwa hier, hier und hier), wie Tanda ist er ein FIFA-Insider. Gerichtsfest dokumentiert ist, dass der ISL/ISMM-Konzern zwischen 1989 und 2001 über 140 Millionen Schweizer Franken an hochrangige Sportfunktionäre zahlte – Gelder, die ISL-Manager vor Gericht als Rechteerwerbskosten bezeichneten, ohne die Vertragsabschlüsse über lukrative TV- und Sponsorendeals unmöglich gewesen wären. Gelder, über die aber selbst das Strafgericht Zug in seinem Urteil vom 26. Juni 2008 feststellte, dass die Bezeichnung als „Schmiergeldzahlungen“ „wohl im Umgangssprachgebrauch“ nicht falsch sei. In einem ausgekoppelten Strafverfahren wurde gegen Teixeira und Havelange als Schmiergeldempfänger sowie die FIFA-Spitze als Dulder ermittelt, weil sie die FIFA durch die Entgegennahme von Millionensummen geschädigt hatten – bis das Verfahren gegen eine Wiedergutmachungszahlung von 5,5 Millionen Schweizer Franken im Mai 2010 eingestellt wurde.

Jean-Francois Tanda hat nach Bekanntwerden der Einstellungsverfügung einen Antrag auf Akteneinsicht gestellt, dem die Staatsanwaltschaft zweimal zustimmte. Doch alle drei beteiligten Parteien blockierten die Herausgabe, zuletzt kurz vor dem FIFA-Kongress Ende Mai 2011 und Blatters Wiederwahl. Es ging vors Obergericht Zug. Auch nachdem Blatter im Oktober 2011 salbungsvoll die Veröffentlichung des ISL-Dokuments angekündigt hatte, zog die FIFA ihre Beschwerde vor dem Obergericht Zug nicht zurück. Stattdessen hatte die FIFA – während sie selbst gegen die Herausgabe der Akten vorging – die Chuzpe, Anfang Dezember 2011 eine Verschiebung der für die Exekutivsitzung am 16. und 17. Dezember in Aussicht gestellten Akteneinsicht zu verkünden und die Schuld dafür auf eine nicht näher beschriebene juristische Blockade von Teixeira oder Havelange zu schieben. Randnotiz: Kurz zuvor hatte das Internationale Olympische Komitee (IOC) seinem dienstältesten Mitglied Havelange einen Abgang aus gesundheitlichen Gründen gestattet, statt ihn wegen seiner ISL-„Provisionen“ als hochkorrupten Funktionär offiziell zu bestrafen. Sein Amt als Ehrenpräsident der FIFA blieb unangetastet.

Die ausgebliebenen Sanktionen von IOC und FIFA könnten nach der Entscheidung des Obergerichts Zugs (im Wortlaut als pdf) zur Veröffentlichung der Einstellungsverfügung nun durch eine öffentliche Darlegung von Havelanges Nehmerqualitäten als Sportfunktionär ersetzt werden. Die drei Parteien haben 30 Tage Zeit, um Einspruch gegen die Entscheidung einzulegen. Reuters meldet, dass die FIFA auf einen Einspruch verzichten will. Das dürfte jedoch nur bedeuten, dass schon der Widerspruch von Teixeira und Havelange genügt, um vor die nächste Instanz zu ziehen und Blatters Zeitspiel fortzuführen. Immerhin: Diese Instanz ist das Schweizer Bundesgericht und damit die letzte. Die „Neue Zürcher Zeitung“ erwartet eine Entscheidung für den Sommer 2012 und lässt FIFA-Medienchef Walter de Gregorio sogar von einem zügigeren Vollzug fabulieren: „Spätestens am Kongress im Mai wollen wir die Akten offenlegen.“ PR ist eben das, wofür der Schweizer Sportjournalist 2010 jetzt auch offiziell bezahlt wird.

Ein Ende des Verfahrens ist auch ohne FIFA-Mithilfe abzusehen, sein Ausgang auch: Der vor dem Bundesgericht gescheiterte Versuch des früheren Schweizer Armee-Chefs Roland Nef, die Einstellungsverfügung eines für ihn unangenehmen Privatverfahrens geheim zu halten, gilt als Präzedenzfall. Auch im Duell Transparenz vs. Korruptionsverdunkelung liegen FIFA & Co. nun mit 0:3 hinten.

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Gesagt ist gesagt (XVII)

Oktober 11th, 2011 sportticker Posted in Fußball, Korruption, Sportpolitik No Comments »

„Man sagt immer, Sepp Blatter müsse Reformen anschieben: welche Reformen denn? In der FIFA läuft alles nach demokratischen Regeln ab, der Afrikaner wählt seine Vertreter, der Europäer, jeder Kontinentalverband.“
(Der professionelle Schwätzer und Verharmloser Franz Beckenbauer adelt FIFA-Präsident Joseph Blatter im Verlautbarungsfachmagazin „Kicker“ zum lupenreinen Demokraten.)1


„They have always been accused of exaggerating the problems in FIFA, but last year has shown that they were understating. (…) They not only sought, but also found the documentation, and that is a great achievement which has been fundamental for the world public’s understanding of FIFA as it is today.“
(Henrik H. Brandt begründet am 6. Oktober bei der Konferenz Play the Game, warum die investigativen Journalisten Andrew Jennings und Jens Weinreich für ihre unermüdliche Aufdeckungsarbeit rund um die Korruptionsfälle im Fußball-Weltverband FIFA den „Play the Game“-Award 2011 erhalten)


„In my respectful opinion, FIFA has fallen far short of a credible demonstration that it recognizes the many problems it faces, that it has the will to solve them, that it is willing to be transparent about what it is doing and what it finds, and that its conduct in the future will be such that the public can be confident in the governance of the sport. At the moment, I do not believe that such confidence exists or would be justified if it did.“
(Der frühere WADA- und IOC-Vizepräsident Richard W. Pound widmete sich in seiner Rede „Responses to Corruption in Sport“ bei Play the Game auch der FIFA)

  1. Der Bayern-Ehrenpräsident ist als FIFA-Exekutivmitglied von 2007 bis Mai 2011 mitverantwortlich für die Zustände im Korruptionssumpf Fußball-Weltverband []
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@PTG: Jennings/Weinreich vs de Gregorio (Fifa)

Oktober 6th, 2011 Christoph Posted in Fußball, Korruption, Medien, Sportpolitik No Comments »

Nungut, im offiziellen (und, Stand jetzt, zuletzt am 5. Oktober geupdateten) Programm von Play the Game steht er nicht.

Aber: Wie es ausschaut, wird gibt sich auch Walter de Gregorio die Ehre geben (Update: 9.55 Uhr), wenn die Fifa-Kenner und -Kritiker Andrew Jennings und Jens Weinreich ab 10.50 Uhr zum Thema „Sepp Blatter’s Round Table: Systemic corruption in the government of world football“ referieren. Es kann nur lustig werden, wenn de Gregorio tatsächlich in Köln aufschlägt (und sich an der Fragerunde beteiligen sollte). Es gibt unter den Play-the-Game-Teilnehmern zwar tatsächlich glühende Claudia-Pechstein-Fans (die, nebenbei, auch Cesar Cielo für absolut unschuldig halten) und Alberto-Contador-Bemitleider (UCI = Böse, Contador = Opfer). Aber selbst latente Fifa-Symphatisanten (die auf der Teilnehmer-Liste stehende Sylvia Schenk wurde noch nicht in Köln gesichtet) gibt es partout nicht. Das ist deshalb eine spannende Ausgangslage, weil sich Walter de Gregorio seinen neuen Job als Direktor Kommunikation und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Fifa durch devotes Hochdienen verdient hat – obwohl er jegliche Ambitionen auf einen dauerhaften Fifa-Job im April 2011 noch dementiert hatte.

Dazu gehört ein von Roger Köppel und Gregorio geführtes Gefälligkeits-Interview in der Schweizer „Weltwoche“ aus dem Dezember 2010, in dem Fifa-Boss Joseph Blatter tatsächlich behaupten durfte: „In der Fifa gibt es keine systematische Korruption.“ Bonus für Blatter: Er durfte Jennings und Weinreich auch als verbohrte Trottel abkanzeln, die sich auf einem Kreuzzug gegen die Fifa verrannt hätten. Dazu gehört aber auch ein Interview von de Gregorio mit der Website persoenlich.com, in dem der damalige Blatter-Berater die PK-Farce während des skandalumtosten Fifa-Kongresses zu einem mutigen Schritt umdeutet und Jennings und Weinreich abspricht, über die Fifa fair zu berichten – und, im Falle Weinreichs, bei Pressekonferenzen meist nur zu kichern statt Farbe zu bekennen.1

Heißt für Play the Game kurzum: Wenn de Gregorio tatsächlich die Chuzpe hat und nach Köln kommt (hat er – als Gast) und mitdiskutiert (mal schauen), wird es mit Sicherheit das unterhaltsamste Panel der Konferenz. Allen Nicht-Anwesenden sei deshalb hiermit noch einmal der PTG-Livestream empfohlen.

Watch live streaming video from playthegame_dshs at livestream.com
  1. Weinreichs Antwort darauf in den Kommentaren hier []
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Play the Game 2011 – Anpfiff in Köln

Oktober 3rd, 2011 Christoph Posted in Korruption, Medien, Sportpolitik 1 Comment »

playthegame_dshs on livestream.com. Broadcast Live Free

Watch live streaming video from playthegame_dshs at livestream.com

Die 7. Auflage von Play the Game läuft, mit Köln macht die Sportjournalismus-Konferenz erstmals in Deutschland Station. Ein Blick über die Teilnehmerliste verrät: Richtig viele deutsche Journalisten haben es nicht nach Köln geschafft, auch nicht von dpa und sid gar keine. Aber vielleicht hat Jens Sejer Andersen gestern beim vorangestellten Deutschlandfunk-Seminar noch ein paar Teilnehmer überzeugen können, ein paar Tage länger in Köln zu bleiben. Dass das Programm lohnt, ist eine Untertreibung.

Highlight am Montag (laut Jens, der immerhin in der PTG-Programmkonferenz sitzt): die Rede von Richard Pound zum Thema Korruption im Sport – und wie sie bekämpft werden muss. (Nachtrag 18.34 Uhr: Pounds beeindruckende Rede im Wortlaut (pdf))

Anbei ein paar Links zu Liveblogs, die den PTG-Livestream sinnvoll ergänzen dürften:

Jens WeinreichDaniel DrepperOliver Fritsch (Twitter) – Jonathan SachseAnja PerkuhnRoger Pielke jr. Osasu Obayiuwana (Twitter)

Kurze Audio-Nachlese des Deutschlandfunk-Seminars < a href="http://www.dradio.de/download/146319/">pdf-Flyer vom 2. Oktober:

Gunter Gebauer: „Deutschland, dein Sport“:

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Bilanz der Konferenz mit Astrid Rawohl (Deutschlandfunk):

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With Jens against corruption: Postpone FIFA elections!

Mai 28th, 2011 sportticker Posted in Fußball, Korruption, Sportpolitik No Comments »

via Jens Weinreich

Jens schreibt angesichts des absurden Wahlkampfs im honorigen Korruptionsfachverband Fifa:

Why not? Einfach mal versuchen. Wollen wir doch mal sehen, was geht, wozu Facebook und Twitter gut sind.

Last uns so größenwahnsinnig sein und die FIFA-Präsidentschaftswahlen verschieben:

Weitersagen, posten, beitreten …


Wir sagen: MITMACHEN!

Und schämen uns derweil für den honorigen Theo Zwanziger. Schon wieder.

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Teufel, überall

November 30th, 2010 sportticker Posted in Fußball, Korruption No Comments »

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